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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                
NO. 05-2074
________________
EILEEN GILGALLON;
RONALD GILGALLON;
MARY HENNIG, AS TAXPAYERS IN
HUDSON COUNTY, NEW JERSEY,
               Appellants
           v.
NEIL CARROLL; VINCENT ASCOLESE;
NEPTALI CRUZ; WILLIAM BRAKER;
NIDIA DAVILA-COLON; WILLIAM O'DEA;
ALBERT CIFELLI; SILVERIO VEGA; MAURICE FITZGIBBONS;
EDWARD J. FLORIO; LABOR MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS, INC.;
ABC CORPORATION 1-100; JANE AND MARY DOES 1-10 (fictitious)
BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF THE COUNTY OF HUDSON;
JUDICIARY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY;
MICHAEL DERMODY
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 00-cv-00591)
District Judge: Honorable William G. Bassler
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 2, 2005
2Before: ROTH, McKEE and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
 (Filed: November 3, 2005)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Appellants appeal the District Court’s order enjoining them from prosecuting an
action in state court against appellee Dermody or filing an action in state or federal court
against Dermody regarding certain issues without prior approval from the District Court. 
Appellants also appeal the order denying their motion for reconsideration of that order.
The ten-year procedural history of this case and the details of appellants’ claims
are well-known to the parties, set forth in the District Court’s thorough opinions, and
need not be discussed at length.  In 1994, Hudson County rejected appellants’ company’s
(CFS) bid for a contract to provide security for County buildings and awarded the
contract to Labor Management Concepts (LMC).  When appellants filed suit in 1995, the
state courts agreed that CFS was not a responsible bidder because it maintained ties with
appellant Ronald Gilgallon who had been convicted of insurance fraud..  The state court
litigation also included settlement of a cross-claim against LMC by the County for
unauthorized telephone calls made by LMC employees.  When the appellants challenged
the validity of the settlement, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey
      In their briefs in a later appeal, appellants alleged that C.A. No. 01-1571 was1
dismissed as a result of a secret alliance of attorneys, including their own, against them. 
However, appellants voluntarily withdrew their appeal in order to file the Rule 60(b)
motion in the District Court.  See C.A. No. 02-1864
3
found that this settlement was proper.  “We concur with the conclusion of Judge Gallipoli
that plaintiff did not show that the County acted illegally or beyond its authority in
agreeing to settle matters with LMC. . . .” Supp. App. at 13.  
Appellants, represented by counsel, then filed a suit in federal court as taxpayers of
the County alleging ultra vires payments to LMC.  The District Court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss.  It found that appellants could not bring their claims
because the County had settled its claims against LMC.  It addressed appellants’
arguments that the settlement agreement was fraudulent based on the date stamps and that
the Board of Chosen Freeholders was unaware of ultra vires payments.  Appellants,
acting pro se, withdrew their appeal of this order.  See C.A. No. 01-1571.   They later1
appealed the denial of a motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). 
We concluded that District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rule 60(b) relief
because the appellants had already challenged the validity of the settlement agreement
based on the date stamps.  We affirmed and noted:
Appellants attempt to draw attention away from the frivolous nature of their claims
by focusing on alleged picayune technical defects in the appellees’ pleadings. 
Appellants also repeatedly claim that their motions and pleadings were not
properly filed or considered.  We note that this Court had access to every
document relevant to and necessary for this Court’s decision.  It is clear to the
Court that appellants are not approaching these proceedings in good faith.  The
federal court system is not a playground to be used by litigants for harassing those
4they dislike.  We emphatically warn appellants that further frivolous filings will
result in sanctions.
See C.A. No. 02-1864.  Appellants had already filed a second federal lawsuit which was
stayed because the District Court found that the substance of their claims was decided on
the merits in the first federal action.  Appellants filed a third lawsuit concerning the
County’s motion to adopt another appellee’s brief on appeal in C.A. No. 02-1864.  This
case was dismissed.  Appellants then filed a fourth lawsuit.  The District Court dismissed
the complaint because appellants’ arguments challenging the settlement had already been
decided by the state and federal courts.  The District Court also enjoined appellants from
filing complaints in that court against the defendants without prior approval.  In affirming
this injunction, we noted “[g]iven appellants’ continued attempts to repackage and
reframe previously litigated claims, we believe the District Court’s injunction was
narrowly tailored to the circumstances.”  We cautioned appellants that “frivolous and
vexatious litigation will lead to additional sanctions.” See C.A. No. 03-2887.  A fifth
federal lawsuit was also dismissed.
Appellants returned to state court and filed a complaint alleging malpractice by
their former attorneys during the first federal proceeding.  They later amended their
complaint to add Hudson County Attorney Michael Dermody, who had been opposing
counsel in the first federal action, as a defendant.  They alleged that Dermody conspired
with their former attorneys to have the first federal case dismissed.  Dermody filed a
motion to dismiss which the state court denied.  He then filed a motion for
5reconsideration.  Dermody also filed a motion in the District Court requesting that the
District Court enjoin the state action against him.  After learning that the state court had
stayed the case, the District Court held oral argument.  On February 8, 2005, the District
Court entered an order enjoining the appellants from prosecuting the state court action or
filing an action in state or federal court against Dermody with respect to certain issues. 
Appellants filed a notice of appeal, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291.
Our review of the District Court’s authority to issue an injunction under the Anti-
Injunction Act is de novo.  In re Diet Drugs, 369 293, 304 (3d Cir. 2004).  We review the
injunction for an abuse of discretion; legal issues are reviewed de novo, and factual issues
are reviewed for clear error. Id.  The District Court set forth the lengthy procedural
history of the case and explicated the relevant case law.  We have little to add to its
thorough opinion and write here briefly to address appellants’ arguments on appeal.
On appeal, appellants argue that their allegations of malpractice against Dermody
have not been previously litigated.  In ruling on appellants’ Rule 60(b) motion, the
District Court in the first federal case addressed their allegations that appellants’ attorneys
and opposing counsel were part of a secret alliance that improperly filed motions. Supp.
App. at 85-86.  Appellants raised these claims in their second federal complaint.  Id. at
121-130.  In his order administratively staying the second federal case, the Magistrate
Judge concluded that “the substance of the facts which give rise to the various claims in
6the proceeding sub judice were decided on the merits against plaintiffs by Judge Bassler
in his March 19th Opinion and Order.” Id. at 164.  In affirming the Magistrate Judge’s
decision, the District Court expressly noted that appellants could address the merits of the
dismissal when the case resumed.  Id. at 188.  Appellants never sought to lift the stay and
challenge this conclusion.  In the fourth federal case, the District Court noted that
appellants had raised the same allegations of violations of filing procedures as the first
federal case.  Id. at 287.
Appellants argue on appeal that there is no need to protect and effectuate the
District Court’s prior judgment.  However, in their second amended complaint in state
court, appellants alleged that Dermody knew the settlement was a fraud and that
appellants’ former attorneys “possessed evidence that would have voided the decision
issued on January 31, 2001.”  Id. at 371.  Appellants are clearly seeking to invalidate the
District Court’s judgment against them.
We note  that the crux of appellants’ allegations in the state court action is that
their former attorneys conspired with Dermody to “simulate” the motion process and
secretly file an unopposed motion to dismiss but not any opposition.  This allegation is
contradicted by the District Court’s addressing of the arguments made in appellants’
opposition and its citation to several of appellants’ exhibits in its opinion.  Id. at 65. 
Appellants further allege in state court that the settlement was fraudulent.  This issue was
clearly addressed in earlier state and federal court litigation.  Moreover, we note that in
7denying the Rule 60(b) motion in the first federal action, the District Court concluded
“[p]laintiffs have not presented any new evidence or fraud that would change the outcome
of the motion to dismiss this action for failure to state a claim.” Id. at 97.  Thus, it is hard
to imagine how appellants will prove prejudice.
Because the District Court’s injunction of the ongoing state proceedings was
issued to effectuate its prior judgments and to protect appellee from future harassing
litigation, we will affirm the District Court’s February 8, 2005, and March 29, 2005,
orders.  Appellant’s request for oral argument is denied.
